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Economic Unity, Cultural Diversity? 
1992 and after 
1 • Introduction 
Within the higher circles of most member countries of the 
European Community "1992" and "internal market" have become 
something like buzzwords. That year stands for some object 
that is highly desirable, and the single market is supposed 
to provide all manners of good things after it. Given the 
turnout at the last election for the European ·Parliament, 
however, for the ordinary citizen 1992 is at MOst something 
necessary or unavoidable. And then there is an old left 
raising the unfashionable (~uestion of increasing social in-
equality. The Cecchini Report calculated the benefits in em-
ployment and productivity resulting from economic unifica-
tion. But how will these advantages be distributed? "Social 
Europe's" special edition on "The social dimension of the 
internal market" did not contain those computations. It is, 
after all, quite possible that per capita average income in-
creases, but that the standard. of living of some segments of 
the EC-population increases less than those of other sec-
tions, and that the situation of special categories deterio-
rates. Did the EC during the 1980s alleviate double digit 
unemployment rates? I like to be counted among those holding 
that an economically unified Western Europe will be a less 
Social Western Europe. 
Today I would like to raise a perhaps more chic question 
about the unintended consequences of 1992: the issue of eco-
nomic unification and the loss of cultural diversity. To 
placate aome and disappoint others: I am not going to argue 
that within a century German and English - in that order -
have turned into the vehicular languages of the European 
Community and that the other European languages got fossil-
ized in class rooms and university departments. Nor will I 
deal with media moguls and insipid information. 
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The development I would like to pinpoint is, I maintain, 
independent of these other possible changes in the cultural 
landscape of Western Europe. I use the word culture in the 
sense of high culture which is opposed to low culture, and I 
will be arguing that because of Western Europe's economic 
integration, its present cultural hierarchy will become ex-
tended and solidified. I thus do see a development towards 
more cultural diversity, but it will be diversity involving 
depreciation and separation. 
2. The class of questions on the end of national cultures 
For some time now, the Dutch quality press has been deal-
ing with the question of whether 1992 will bring about the 
end of a separate Dutch culture. Similar questions about the 
end of their national culture are being discussed in other 
EC-countries - and in countries that consider joining the 
EC. I have to say that I was not very impressed by the argu-
ments of the French film and television celebrities in last 
year's "train de la culture" from Paris to Strasbourg. If it 
is held that without a European cultural policy france will 
be overrun by American and Japanese mass culture, one might 
consider the possibility that for decades if not centuries 
the elites of Europe and the world have been dazzled by such 
French higtbrow glitter as haute couture and accessoires, 
and intoxicated by such French classy drugs as parfum and 
cognac. In fact, even Eurosceptics sense that there is some-
thing wrong with questions on the end of·national cultures. 
Mrs. Thatcher in her speech in Bruges two years ago stated 
that the cathedrals, literature and language of Great Brit-
ain show how much of British cultural wealth is derived from 
the other countries of Europe. Since cultures never were 
isolated from one another to begin with, questions about 
their disappearance pose the issue poorly. 
Is the underlying issue then whether economic unification 
makes for even more amalgamation of national cultures and 
which national culture will become dominant? This question 
still is not very good. If societies are stratified, only 
social strata within a country have a culture: Next to the 
dominant Culture of its upper strata finding intermittent 
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adherence elsewhere in society, there are subcultures rooted 
in the lower rungs of the social scale. 
Come to that, the question to what extent the cultures of 
the upper strata of the EC-member countries grow to resemble 
one another and whether those of their lower strata will do 
so too, is rather vague. It has been held (Merton 1949) that 
in societies like those of Western Europe the lower strata 
have a way of life. focused on the here and now, whereas the 
upper strata have a more cosmopolitan life style. The Cul-
ture of the upper strata not only goes back farther in time, 
but it also crosses borders more often. Thus the more pre-
cise question is whether economic unification will increase 
cosmopolitism in all strata of society. 
But even that question does not press the issue far 
enough. Will economic unification decrease or increase the 
gap in cosmopolitism between the cultures of the upper and 
lower strata of the emerging Westeuropean supranational 
state? Just as social inequality can increase because of the 
European Community, so can cultural inequality. Having 
stated my main question, I now develop my answer. 
J •· The short answer 
There is a short answer to my question, and a long one. 
First the short one. People who, because of their job, di-
rectly deal with foreign countries build u~ s cultural stock 
with a cosmopolitan composition. If, because of the European 
Community, the upper strata within one EC-country become 
more involved with other EC-countries than the lower strata 
within this country, differences in cultural cosmopolitism 
within one EC-country will be widening. I hold that this 
will be the case. Members of upper strata more often will 
have jobs bringing them in personal contact with other coun-
t.ries than persons belonging to a society's lower strata. 
That is my short answer. Now my long, if not very long an-
swer. 
4. The spiralling attractions of vanity fair 
Even in modern society there is a fine and thin line ·be-
tween something that is distinct and something that is dis-
tinctive. This notion was kept alive during the last decade 
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by Bourdieu (1979). That this line in the course of modern 
times moved up and up was documented by Elias ( 1939) • Why 
this line moved and what effects this had for the world of 
Culture has been shown by Gombrich (1974). My long answer to 
the question I just stated, extends ideas of these scholars. 
According to Gombrich in every society people vie for the 
esteem of others. Given the positional nature of these goods 
- there is only one Qumber one (Hirsch 1977) - demand always 
exceeds supply, and this situation makes people spend more 
and more time and energy on the same amount of esteem. This 
explanation of inflation - so Gombrich holds - is applicable 
to any thing that is valued by society, including fashion, 
interior decoration, architecture and painting. In all these 
fields things occur that also happen on vanity fair. 
When elaborating this explanation, Gombrich applies Pop-
per's (1945) distinction between closed and open societies. 
In closed societies people will spend more of the same re-
sources on attaining esteem. (Think of the potlatch of the 
Kwakiutl.) In open societies inventions will be made - be it 
ever more daring decolletes or miniskirts turning into long 
blouses, reversals of figure and grol.f'ld or interlacing, 
crosswise arches or flying buttresses, foreshortening or 
perspective, sfumato or coloured shades. In the case of 
fashion, the r ;thorities of early modern times still tried 
to halt this endless match by sumptuary laws (Schwartzen 
1899, Hooper 1915). It took them a while to discover that 
these laws have their own built-in spirals. Perhaps the 
present higher value-added tax for luxury goods in the EC 
does a better job. 
At present Western Europe's national authorities are fu-
elling these battles - not in the field of fashion, but in 
that of high culture. National orchestras are touring the 
world, and state museums are hoarding treasures and putting 
up exhibitions to attract tourists. That lists with names of 
musicians in these orchestras read like a roll-call in the 
United Nations is another matter. It certainly was interest-
ing to see so much of Arles, france, at the Van Gogh exhibi-
tion this summer in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. 
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I hold that the completion of the EC will foster this 
battle of the giants. Cultural elites, out of fear of loos-
ing the prime position they have in their own country, will 
press for protection by their national government. Out of 
fear of lower national prestige some authorities will give 
in. Cultural policies are much cheaper than social policies, 
and cultural elites are better organized than the truly dis-
advantaged. 
Since even in cultural matters the first blow is half the 
battle, Paris may become the permanent cultural capital of 
Europe. Here for several decades presidents have been waging 
a prestige battle by way of cultural means. Lea grands pro-
jets will become bigger, larger and vaster. The cosmopolitan 
nature of french Megaculture perspires from the fact that 
the architect of the Op6ra Bastille is a Canadian from 
Uruguay and that the opera's musical director was born in 
South Korea and trained in the lhited States. But what if 
Berlin becomes the capital of a united East and West Germa-
ny? A change in the European system of economic and politi-
cal power in favour of Germany, will intensify the competi-
tion for prestige between france and Germany. That contest 
will also leave a cultural heritage to future generations. 
5. The separation of high and low culture in modern times 
It is generally accepted that the industrial and demo-
cratic revolutions in Western Europe led to social levelling 
(Nisbet 1966). Research on trends during the present century 
in income inequality, father-son social mobility and cross-
class marriages, substantiate this. Whether the rise of the 
West was accompanied by smaller cultural inequalities is an-
other matter. Indeed, upon fitting pieces of recent histori-
cal research together, I come to the conclusion that in mod-
ern times high culture became separated from low culture. 
Kempers (1987} demonstrated that the formation of city 
states in Italy between 1250 and 1600 was accompanied by a 
heightened prestige of artists. It may be presumed that if 
painters adopt civilized manners and by way of their wares 
magnify church and state, an official culture will split off 
from popular culture. Peter Burke (1978} has argued that al-
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though the upper strata of European societies always had 
their own culture, up until the end of the middle ages they 
still participated in popular culture. Their withdrawal from 
popular culture in England and france went farther and fast-
er than in the other countries of Europe. In Holland this 
separation occurred at the end of the seventeenth century. 
According to Williams (1958) the idea of culture, and the 
word itself in its ·general modern uses, came into English 
thinking in the period of the industrial revolution. It did 
so as a response to the new problems of social class. The 
expanding middle classes and the rising working classes were 
demanding full citizenship, but the establishment found them 
wanting in culture. According to William Weber (1975) the 
explosion of classical concerts in London, Paris and Vienna 
during the first half of the nineteenth century, when the 
bureaucracies of the national state came into being, marked 
a cultural watershed between the higher and lower middle 
classes. levine (1988) showed that even in the United States 
of America, a country without s feudal past where people 
were each other's political equals, from 1850 on a cultural 
hierarchy emerged, leading to the sacralization of culture. 
Reviewing these findings, I hold that if a master tre~d 
is to be postulated, it is one toward sharper cultural sepa-
ration. If the formation of city states around florence and 
Venice before the end of the middle ages led to larger cul-
tural differences between upper and lower strata, and if the 
formation of national states in Austrta, England and france 
in early modern times had similar consequences, it is to be 
expected that the formation of a supranational state in 
Western Europe since 1957 enlarged and after 1992 will 
enlarge cultural differences. 
6. Open social structures and the importance (£[' attached 
culture 
But why should modern state formation make for larger 
cultural differences? One part of the answer is that . the 
cleavage between high and low culture became wider exactly 
because - with the rise of the modern state - individuals 
became upwardly mobile and whole classes rose. Which, of 
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course, is not to say that closed and unrivaled upper strata 
lack a way of life of their own. 
It has often been held that the tastes of upwardly mobile 
persons may be expensive, but that they remain unrefined. It 
is, indeed, difficult for anyone to kick old habits. aut if 
the newly rich were to be quick in doing ao, they would dis-
cover that the goal to be attained in the meantime hed moved 
up. Newcomers threaten the prestige of the established, and 
so do rising classes. To ward off this threat - so holds 
Elias - the establishment sharpens its standards of cultiva-
tion. These principles are weapons in the struggle for pres-
tige fostered by the universal rights of the modern open so-
ciety. The battle lost by the established on the labour or 
capital market or within organizations awarding educational 
credentials, is continued with other means in markets for 
consunption goods. Clothes, houses and their furnishing, 
paintings and musical performances are consunption goods. 
Because of stricter standards, newcomers remain outsiders. 
Refinement of taste might even lower the incidence of social 
mobility. But if the upper strata themselves are sliding 
down fast, they can no longer maintain their standards. This 
is one explanation of why standards sometimes get blunted. 
Am I pressing my argURent too far? I do not really think 
so. I often pondered such queatio~s as why artisans once 
struggled for a wealthy costumer to turn and carve the left 
and right leg of a chair in such a way that they became mir-
ror images, and why later on ide1:1Ucal machine-made legs 
were rejected as coarse. Yardsticks for judging persons in 
taste often are not arbitrary. ~or are standards for assess-
ing the artistic value of objects. The point is that the 
cut-off point on this sliding scale slides. Iri addition, 
there is some evidence that although the influence of the 
income of parents on their child's education in a country 
like the Netherlands diminished, the effect of the cultural 
resources commanded by parents increased (De Graef 1986). 
The European Community in two ways might make for expan-
sion of upper strata. Firat there is upward mobility result-
ing directly from the formation of supranational institu-
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tiona. These organizations will become populated by func-
tionaries, and just as civil servants in public conscious-
ness rank above municipal officials, the increasing nunber 
of Eurocrats will have more prestige than civil servants. 
Secondly, these Eurocrats in turn make upward mobility 
possible. Due to their activities, the free flow of capital 
and labour and the mutual recognition of educational creden-
tials give rise to new inequalities in income between compa-
ny directors and between higher executives: Above the old 
top consisting of those in charge of companies operating on 
one national market only, arises a new stratum with higher 
positions within companies operating on the European mar-
ket. Given the way these persons travel around, they will 
develop a highly cosmopolitan culture. The emergence of this 
stratum extends the existing cultural hierarchy. Since the 
European Convnunity was founded in 1957, I assert that this 
stratum is well into existence by 1992. 
7. Effects of large numbers 
The other part of the answer to the question why cultural 
inequalities sharpened in modern times consists of what I 
call effects of large nunbers. The explanation of why more 
individual upward mobility or the rise of a whole class 
makes for cultural differences is incomplete. It looks like 
an explanation invoking the will of particular persons to 
act in a certain way. As if opportunities to do so were un-
important. . 
Of course, the standards of someone lonely at the top 
will not be rashly adopted by the rest of society. Yet it is 
quite possible that the standards of a small upper stratum 
prevail. The lower strata may reject the culture of the up-
per strata. But the norms of the upper strata are cosmopoli-
tan, while those of the lower strata are local, and thus 
different from place to place. This gives the upper strata a 
competitive edge (Popitz 1968), making their standards pre-
dominate. 
In addition, within a society with large social inequali-
ties, for a small upper class those in strata way down below 
are no party to outshine in sumptuousness, taste and artie-
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tic judgment. Excellence arises among a large number of al-
most equals. An upper class dispersed over the countryside 
leads a more frugal life than one concentrated in the city. 
If national capitals are surpassed by a supranational one, 
cultural 1i fe in this metropolis will flour ish even more 
than in old-time capital9. Just as the division of labour is 
limited by the extent of the Market, ao the more members an 
upper stratum counts, the more it unintendedly solidifies 
its cultural separation. 
Huizinga (1941) explained a peculiarity of Dutch cultural 
history by invoking em all numbers. During the seventeenth 
century in this country the distinction between the learned 
and those without university education did not imply the op-
position between the civilized and the uncivilized. Militia 
guilds and chambers of rhetoric were responsible for the 
participation in cultural life of the learned professions, 
merchants in foreign goods and retailers. To realize cultu-
ral aspirations,the professions in small cities were thrown 
back on other strata. 
According to fisher (1946)1 the expenses on conspicuous 
cOnsumption of the British landed nobility rose in the six-
teenth and seventeenth century when it started to stay in 
London during "the season". Sykes ( 1985) has shown to what 
extent the building of townhouses, as a shalter for this 
season, wee guided by the ambition of every aristocrat of 
note to outdo the next in glitter arid extravagance. As de-
scribed with English understatement by Lambert (1989), in 
the twentieth century "c011ing out" parties during the London 
season were a perfect form of social closure. The debutantes 
of the 1939 season were not ignorant of but indifferent to 
the concentration camps for Jews being erected in Germany. 
I see no reason to assume that effects of large numbers 
obtain for daya gone by only. According to Bourdieu (1979) 
in the early 1960s the knowledge of film directors among 
persons with a high education in Paris was more extensive 
than that of persons with the same education in Lille. This 
finding may seem trivial, but an explanation invoking a 
weaker interest in films in Lille seems insufficient, where-
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as an explanation stressing the more ample opportunities in 
Paris is more appealing. But in that case an effect of large 
numbers has been specified. 
So how about the size of the transnational business elite 
that is developing in the EC, and how about the size of the 
elite of the EC's institutions? I do hold that these upper 
strata will develop enough critical mass for solid cultural 
standards. I also maintain that any too small number is off-
set by the way these elites are educated. Private interna-
tional business schools emerging outside the state-run edu-
cational system in Western Europe make for an homogeneous 
and interconnected business elite having a pretty fixed life 
style (Marceau 1989). So do the french ecoles (Bourdieu 
1989), those training grounds for state officials that are 
looked upon with en.,y in other EC-countries. Overtrumping 
within these elites will result in cultural standards pretty 
far removed from those of the social strata under it. 
Combining these effects of large numbers with those of 
mobility, I conclude that in the wake of 1992 the cultural 
hierarchy in the EC will become extended and solidified. 
B. Conclusion 
The picture I have painted of what 1992 has in store with 
respect to cultural diversity in Western Europe is not very 
bright. Sure, cultural diversity will increase, but it does 
so because the social scale is being elongated at its upper 
end. In fact, I have not paid any attention to Dahrendorf's 
( 1988) thesis that a new underclass ·is forming in the EC. 
The damage done by double digit unemployment rates during 
the 1980s, will carry over into later decades. I need not 
argue here that the way of life of the longterm unemployed 
is narrowly circumscribed in time and place (Ultee 1986). 
There may be a fine and thin line between highbrow and 
lowbrow culture. But there is a vast difference between a 
society containing various cultures displaying stark con-
trasts in cosmopolitism, and a society in which each ·and 
every inhabitant is conversant with more than one culture. I 
do think that the upper strata of the various EC-countries 
will develop one common cosmopolitan culture, but it remains 
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to be seen how much the cultures of the top and the bottom 
in the European Community will have in common. 
References 
Bourdieu, Pierre, La distinction, Critique sociale du 
jugement, Paris, Hinuit, 1979 
Bourdieu, Pierre, La noblesse d'etat, Grandee ecoles et 
esprit de_corpa, Paris Minuit, 1989 
Burke, Peter, Popular culture in early modern Europe, lon-
don, Temple Smith, 1978 
Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General 
for Economic and Financial Affaire, The economics of 
1992, luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 1988 (European Economy No 35) 
Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General 
for Employment, Social Affaire and Education, The social 
dimension of the internal 111arket, Luxembourg, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1988 
(Social Europe special edition) 
Dahrendorf, Ralf, The modern social conflict, london, Wei-
denfeld & Nicolson, 1988 
Elias, Norbert, Uber den ProzeB der Ziviliaation, Soziogene-
tiache und phylogenetiache Untersuchungen, Bern, Verlag 
Franke, 1939 
Fisher, F.J., The development of london as a centre of con-
spicuous consumption in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 
4th series, 30(1948)37-50 
Gombrich, E. H., The logic of vanity fair: alternatives to 
historicism in the study of fashions, style and taste 
(1974), pp. 60-92 in: E.H. Gombrich, Ideals and idols, 
Essays on values in history and in art, Oxford, Phaidon, 
1979 
Graef, Paul de, The impact of financial and cultural re-
sources on educational attail'llllent in the Netherlands, 
Sociology of Education, 59(1986)237-246 
Hirsch, Fred, Social limits to growth, london, Routledge, 
1977 
- 319 -
Hooper, Wilfrid, The Tudor sumptuary laws, English Histori-
cal Review, 30(1915)433-449 
Huizinga, J., Nederland's beschaving in de zevetiende eeuw, 
Groningen, Tjeenk Willink, 1941 
Kempers, Bram, Kunst, macht en mecanaat, Het beroep van 
schilder in socials verhoudingen 1250-1600, Amsterdam, 
Arbeiderspers, 1987 
Lambert, Angela, 1939:. the last season of peace, London, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989 
Levine, Lawrence W., Highbrow/loWbrow: the emergence of cul-
tural hierarchy in America, Cambridge Mass., Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1988 
Marceau, Jane, A familiy business? The making of an interna-
tional businesa elite, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1989 
Merton, Robert K., Patterns of influence: local and cosmo-
politan influential& (1949), pp. 387-420 in Robert K. 
Merton, Social theory and social structure, revised an~ 
enlarged edition, New York, Free Presa, 1957 
Nisbet, Robert, '~"he sociological tradition, London, Heine-
mann, 1966 
Popitz, Heinrich, Prozesse der Machtbildung, TUbingen, Mohr, 
1968 
Popper, K.R., The open society and its enemies, London, 
Routledge, 1945 
Schwartzen, Julius, Verordnungen gegen Luxus und Kleider-
pracht in Hamurg, Zeitschrift f"Ur . Kulturgeschichte, 
6(1899)67-102 und 170-190 
Sykes, Christopher Simon, Private palaces, Life in the great 
London houses, London, Chatto & Windus, 1985 
Ultee, W.C., High unemplo)'lllent and social differentiation, 
pp. 237-270 in: Social and Cultural Planning Office, So-
cial and cultural report 1986, Rijswijk, Hinistry·of Wel-
fare, Health and cultural affairs, 1987 
Weber, William, Music and the middle class, The social 
structure of concert life in London, Paris and Vienna, · 
London, Croom Helm, 1975 
Williams, Raymond, Culture and society 1780-1950, London, 
Hogarth, 1958 
- 320 -
